Not long ago,  Denys Ray Hughes, 59, of Phoenix, AZ, was found guilty of Attempted Production of a Biological Toxin for Use as a Weapon, Possession of an Unregistered Destructive Device and Possession of an Unregistered Silencer, by a federal jury.

The evidence at his trial showed that Hughes grew castor bean plants and cultivated thousands of their seeds, which contain the toxin called ricin. Hughes further possessed the necessary precursor materials, as well as written instructions for extracting the toxin. The government also proved at trial that Hughes possessed a destructive device, specifically, a pipe bomb, and multiple silencers.

Hughes' conviction for Attempted Production of a Biological Toxin for Use as a Weapon carried a penalty of life imprisonment, and a $250,000 fine.

To prepare for potential attacks in the United States involving weapons of mass destruction, the US Congress approved the development of National Guard's Civil Support Teams which are responsible with identifying chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive weapons; assessing consequences; advising civil authorities on response measures; and assisting with requests for additional support.

So far, 36 of the 55 approved teams have been fully certified to conduct their mission. The National Guard Bureau is in the process of establishing, certifying, and planning for the long-term sustainment of the CSTs, according to an unclassified report submitted to the National Association of Chiefs of Police by the GAO.

The established CSTs have thus far been trained, equipped, and staffed and have command and control mechanisms in place to conduct their domestic mission. However, confusion resulting from a lack of guidance on the types of non-WMD missions the CSTs can conduct to prepare for their WMD terrorism mission could impede coordination between state authorities and local emergency management officials on the appropriate use of the CSTs.

CSTs were created to focus on assisting civil authorities in domestic WMD events. Based on its review of the CSTs' training, equipment, and staffing criteria; analysis of CST readiness data; site visits to 14 CSTs; and discussions with state, local, and federal responders, analysts from the Government Accounting Office found the certified teams visited to be ready to conduct their mission.

NGB and the states have a clear structure for operational command and control of the CSTs. Though current NGB guidance and the CSTs' message to state and local officials emphasize the CST mission as being focused on WMD events, some CSTs have responded to non-WMD events, such as providing emergency assistance to the Gulf Coast states after the 2005 hurricanes.

While NGB views such missions as useful preparations for WMD events, guidance has not been clarified to reflect the type of non-WMD missions that would be appropriate. This lack of clarity has caused confusion among state, local, and NGB officials, potentially slowing coordination efforts.

Also, the Department of Defense is proposing a limited role for the CSTs to coordinate and operate with Mexican and Canadian officials in the event of a cross-border WMD incident. DOD and NGB are informally considering limited overseas missions for the teams, though they have no plans to request a further expansion of the CSTs' mission to encompass overseas operations.

According to NGB and the CST commanders, some overseas missions could provide valuable experience and have a positive effect on CST readiness, while other, more demanding missions, such as supporting the warfighters, could be detrimental to the readiness and availability of the CSTs.

Although NGB continues to develop a long-term sustainment plan for the CST program, going forward, it faces challenges to the administration and management of the CSTs that could impede both the progress of newer teams and the long-term sustainment of the program. NGB has made progress in establishing an administrative management structure for the CSTs, including issuing a broad CST management regulation and initiating a standardization and evaluation program.

But the CSTs face challenges in personnel, coordination plans, equipment acquisition and planning, training objectives, readiness reporting and facilities. Also, insufficient NGB guidance on state National Guard roles and responsibilities for overseeing and supporting their CSTs has resulted in varied support at the state National Guard level.

NGB is aware of the challenges and has efforts under way to address them. While these challenges have not yet undermined CST readiness, if NGB efforts are unsuccessful, the progress of newer teams could be impeded and the long-term sustainment of the CST program put at greater risk.

Jim Kouri, CPP is currently fifth vice-president of the National Association of Chiefs of Police and he's a staff writer for the New Media Alliance (thenma.org).  In addition, he's the new editor for the House Conservatives Fund's weblog. Kouri also serves as political advisor for Emmy and Golden Globe winning actor Michael Moriarty. 

He's former chief at a New York City housing project in Washington Heights nicknamed "Crack City" by reporters covering the drug war in the 1980s. In addition, he served as director of public safety at a New Jersey university and director of security for several major organizations.  He's also served on the National Drug Task Force and trained police and security officers throughout the country.   Kouri writes for many police and security magazines including Chief of Police, Police Times, The Narc Officer and others. He's a news writer for TheConservativeVoice.Com and PHXnews.com.  He's also a columnist for AmericanDaily.Com, MensNewsDaily.Com, MichNews.Com, and he's syndicated by AXcessNews.Com.   He's appeared as on-air commentator for over 100 TV and radio news and talk shows including Oprah, McLaughlin Report, CNN Headline News, MTV, Fox News, etc.  His book Assume The Position is available at Amazon.Com. Kouri's own website is located at http://jimkouri.us

On Tuesday, former Clinton Administration adviser Dick Morris told Fox News Channel that President-Elect Barack Obama's motive for the nomination of Leon Panetta to the important post of Director of Central Intelligence is to tear that agency apart.

 

While I concur with Morris' assessment (I rarely agree with the bloviating Morris), it is my hope Panetta will be either turned away during his confirmation hearings or his name will be withdrawn altogether.

 

Efforts to combat terrorism have become an increasingly important part of government activities. These efforts have also become important in the United States' relations with other countries and with international organizations.

The United States' intelligence community is undergoing the most extensive — perhaps even radical — transformations since the Office of Strategic Services gave way to the Central Intelligence Agency.

 

Recognizing that people are the critical element in transformation initiatives is key to a successful transformation of the intelligence community and related homeland security organizations.

 

The CIA is responsible for coordinating US counterintelligence activities abroad. Each of the military departments also has a counterintelligence element that operates domestically and overseas.

 

The mission of intelligence agencies is to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence to their consumers. Human sources and technical collection systems can be developed only over long periods of time and often at great cost. They are easily compromised and, when compromised, often cannot be replaced. Accordingly, intelligence agencies are by nature reluctant to permit consumers, including law enforcement agencies, to use intelligence in any way that might result in the loss of a source or collection method.

These elements have offensive and defensive missions. Offensively, they attempt to recruit agents within foreign intelligence services to ascertain what, if any, operations are being undertaken against the United States; they monitor the activities of known or suspected agents of foreign intelligence services; and they undertake operations to ascertain the targets and modus operandi of foreign intelligence services.

Defensively, they investigate cases of suspected espionage and prepare analyses for government and industry concerning the foreign intelligence threat. While the FBI has principal jurisdiction to investigate suspected espionage within the United States, all intelligence agencies maintain internal capabilities to undertake preliminary inquiries of their own employees. Military counterintelligence elements have concurrent jurisdiction to carry out counterintelligence investigations of their respective military personnel.

Counterintelligence, as a function of intelligence agencies, however, goes well beyond detecting and monitoring the activities of foreign intelligence services and investigating employees suspected of espionage. Counterintelligence is an integral part of the entire intelligence process.

Historically, intelligence agencies have not performed this crucial function very well. Virtually all have suffered severe losses due to a failure to recognize anomalous behavior on the part of their own employees. Some have also had problems recognizing anomalies in the behavior of their sources or in the appearance or actions of their targets. And into this mix, President Obama wishes to insert the likes of Leon Panetta, a left-wing Democrat Party operative.

Successful major change management initiatives in large public and private sector organizations can often take at least 5 to 7 years to create what is needed to ensure success. As a result, committed and sustained leadership is indispensable to making lasting changes in the intelligence community.

Accordingly, the US Congress may want to consider lengthening the terms served by the directors of the intelligence agencies, similar to the FBI Director's 10-year term as was recommended by a panel from the General Accounting Office last year.

One of the major challenges facing the intelligence community is moving from a culture of "need to know" to a "need to share" organizations, while maintaining secrecy. The experience of leading organizations suggests that performance management systems — that define, align, and integrate institutional, unit, and individual performance with organizational goals — can provide incentives and accountability for sharing information to help achieve this shift.

Some critics of the CIA claim that over the years it has become more of a "think tank" than an intelligence gathering and counterterrorism organization. One official alleges that politics within "The Company" resembles the politics exhibited at American universities, with bureaucrats "living in ivory towers far removed from the real world of espionage and terrorism."

Significant changes have been underway in the last 3 years regarding how the federal workforce is managed. The Congress passed legislation providing certain government-wide human resources flexibilities, such as direct hiring authority by agency executives. While many federal agencies have received such flexibility, others may be both needed and appropriate for intelligence agencies, such as providing these agencies with the authority to hire a limited number of term-appointed positions on a noncompetitive basis.

Sources: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Homeland Security, General Accountability Office, National Security Institute, National Association of Chiefs of Police.