Blagojevich, 51, and Harris, 46, both of Chicago, were each charged with conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud and solicitation of bribery. They were charged in a two-count criminal complaint that was sworn out on Sunday and unsealed today following their arrests, which occurred without incident, announced Patrick J. Fitzgerald, United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, and Robert D. Grant, Special Agent-in-Charge of the Chicago Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

A 76-page FBI affidavit alleges that Blagojevich was intercepted on court-authorized wiretaps during the last month conspiring to sell or trade Illinois’ US Senate seat vacated by President-elect Barack Obama for financial and other personal benefits for himself and his wife. At various times, in exchange for the Senate appointment, Blagojevich discussed obtaining:

• A substantial salary for himself at a either a non-profit foundation or an organization affiliated with labor unions;
• Placing his wife on paid corporate boards where he speculated she might garner as much as $150,000 a year;
• Promises of campaign funds – including cash up front; and
• A cabinet post or ambassadorship for himself.

Just last week, on December 4, Blagojevich allegedly told an advisor that he might “get some (money) up front, maybe” from Senate Candidate 5, if he named Senate Candidate 5 to the Senate seat, to insure that Senate Candidate 5 kept a promise about raising money for Blagojevich if he ran for re-election. In a recorded conversation on October 31, Blagojevich described an earlier approach by an associate of Senate Candidate 5 as follows: “We were approached ‘pay to play.’ That, you know, he’d raise 500 grand. An emissary came. Then the other guy would raise a million, if I made him (Senate Candidate 5) a Senator.”

On November 7, Blagojevich said he needed to consider his family and that he is “financially” hurting while talking on the phone about the Senate seat with Harris and an advisor, the affidavit states. Harris allegedly said that they were considering what would help the “financial security” of the Blagojevich family and what will keep Blagojevich “politically viable.” Blagojevich stated, “I want to make money,” adding later that he is interested in making $250,000 to $300,000 a year, the complaint alleges.

On November 10, in a lengthy telephone call with numerous advisors that included discussion about Blagojevich obtaining a lucrative job with a union-affiliated organization in exchange for appointing a particular Senate Candidate whom he believed was favored by the President-elect and which is described in more detail below, Blagojevich and others discussed various ways Blagojevich could “monetize” the relationships he has made as governor to make money after leaving that office.

“The breadth of corruption laid out in these charges is staggering,” Mr. Fitzgerald said. “They allege that Blagojevich put a ‘for sale’ sign on the naming of a United States Senator; involved himself personally in pay-to-play schemes with the urgency of a salesman meeting his annual sales target; and corruptly used his office in an effort to trample editorial voices of criticism. The citizens of Illinois deserve public officials who act solely in the public’s interest, without putting a price tag on government appointments, contracts and decisions,” he added.

Mr. Grant said: “Many, including myself, thought that the recent conviction of former governor would usher in a new era of honesty and reform in Illinois politics. Clearly, the charges announced today reveal that the office of the Governor has become nothing more than a vehicle for self-enrichment, unrestricted by party affiliation and taking Illinois politics to a new low.”

Mr. Fitzgerald and Mr. Grant thanked the Chicago offices of the Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation Division, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service and the U.S. Department of Labor Office of Inspector General for assisting in the ongoing investigation. The probe is part of Operation Board Games, a five-year-old public corruption investigation of pay-to-play schemes, including insider-dealing, influence-peddling and kickbacks involving private interests and public duties.

Federal agents yesterday also executed search warrants at the offices of Friends of Blagojevich located at 4147 North Ravenswood, Suite 300, and at the Thompson Center office of a deputy governor.

The Department of Energy oversees contractors that operate more than 200 "high-hazard" nuclear facilities, where an accident could have serious consequences for workers and the general public.

DOE is charged with regulating the safety of these facilities. A key part of DOE's self-regulation is the Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS), which develops, oversees, and helps enforce nuclear safety policies. This is the only DOE safety office intended to be independent of the program offices, which carry out mission responsibilities.

At the request of the US Congress, the Government Accounting Office reviewed relevant DOE policies, interviewed officials and outside safety experts, and surveyed DOE sites to determine the number and status of nuclear facilities. GAO also assessed oversight practices against the criteria for independent oversight GAO developed based on a series of reports on DOE nuclear safety and discussions with nuclear safety experts.

HSS falls short of fully meeting GAO's elements of effective independent oversight of nuclear safety: independence, technical expertise, ability to perform reviews and have findings effectively addressed, enforcement, and public access to facility information.

For example, HSS's ability to function independently is limited because it has no role in reviewing the "safety basis" -- a technical analysis that helps ensure safe design and operation of these facilities -- for new high-hazard nuclear facilities and because it has no personnel at DOE sites to provide independent safety observations.

In addition, although HSS conducts periodic site inspections and identifies deficiencies that must be addressed, there are gaps in its inspection schedule and it lacks useful information on the status of the safety basis of all nuclear facilities.

For example, HSS was not aware that 31 of the 205 facilities did not have a safety basis that meets requirements established in 2001. Finally, while HSS uses its authority to enforce nuclear safety requirements, its actions have not reduced the occurrence of over one-third of the most commonly reported violations in the last 3 years, although this is a priority for HSS. These shortcomings are largely attributable to DOE's decision that some responsibilities and resources of HSS and prior oversight offices more appropriately reside in the program offices.

For instance, DOE decided in 1999 to eliminate independent oversight personnel at its sites because they were deemed redundant and less effective than oversight by the program offices. DOE also decided in forming HSS in 2006 that its involvement in reviewing facility safety basis documents was not necessary because this is done by the program offices and adequately assessed by HSS during periodic site inspections.

Moreover, DOE views HSS's role as secondary to the program offices in addressing recurring nuclear safety violations. Nearly all these shortcomings are in part caused by DOE's desire to strengthen oversight by the program offices, with HSS providing assistance to them in accomplishing their responsibilities.

In the absence of external regulation, DOE needs HSS to be more involved in nuclear safety oversight because a key objective of independent oversight is to avoid the potential conflicts of interest that are inherent in program office oversight.

In spring 2007, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and state and local health officials worked together to interdict two individuals with drug-resistant infectious tuberculosis (TB) from crossing U.S. borders and direct them to treatment. Concerns arose that HHS's and DHS's responses to the incidents were delayed and ineffective. The US Congress asked the Government Accounting Office  to examine  the factors that affected HHS's and DHS's responses to the incidents, the extent to which HHS and DHS made changes to response procedures as a result of the incidents, and HHS's and DHS's efforts to assess the effectiveness of changes made as a result of the incidents. GAO analysts reviewed agency documents and interviewed officials about the procedures in place at the time of the incidents and changes made since. Various factors--a lack of comprehensive procedures for information sharing and coordination and border inspection shortfalls--hindered the federal response to the two TB incidents. GAO's past work and federal internal control standards call for collaborative communication and coordination across agencies; communication flowing down, across, and up agencies to help managers carry out their internal control responsibilities; and effective leadership, capabilities, and accountability to ensure effective preparedness and response to hazardous situations. HHS and DHS finalized a memorandum of understanding in October 2005 intended to promote communication and coordination in response to public health incidents, but they had not fully developed operational procedures to share information and coordinate their efforts. Thus, HHS and DHS lost time locating or identifying the individuals to interdict them at the U.S. border. Also, HHS lacked procedures to coordinate with state and local health officials to determine when to use federal isolation and quarantine authorities, which further contributed to the delay in the federal response to one of the incidents. Finally, DHS had deficiencies in its process for inspecting individuals at the border, which caused delays in locating the individuals with TB. HHS and DHS have subsequently implemented procedures and tools intended to address deficiencies identified by the incidents, consistent with GAO's past work and internal control standards, but the departments could take additional steps to enhance their ability to respond to future TB incidents. Since the 2007 incidents, HHS and DHS have developed formal procedures for HHS to request DHS's assistance, and DHS has developed a watch list for airlines to identify individuals with TB and other infectious diseases who are to be stopped from traveling and revised its border inspection process to include a requirement that individuals with TB identified by HHS be subject to further inspection. DHS has also enhanced its process for creating public health alerts based on some variations of biographic information (e.g., name, date of birth, or travel document information), but has not explored the benefits of creating these alerts based on other variations, which impeded DHS's ability to interdict one of the individuals at the border. In addition, HHS has not yet completed efforts to provide information on changes in procedures to state and local health officials, who typically originate requests for assistance, to help mitigate delays in accessing federal assistance. HHS and DHS identified additional actions that need to be taken to further strengthen their response, but have not developed plans for completing them. HHS and DHS have activities under way to assess the effectiveness of the new procedures and tools, including performance monitoring and cross-agency meetings to discuss and revise the new procedures and tools based on actual experiences. HHS and DHS have coordinated on more than 70 requests for assistance since the 2007 incidents through February 2008; officials said they view each incident as a test of the efficacy of their responses.

Nearly 30 North Carolina law enforcement agencies have succeeded in locating offenders and wanted suspects without leaving their desks. The agencies are part of a five-county pilot project utilizing an integrated justice solution called JusticeXchange. The computerized service provides law enforcement with up-to-date access to booking records, warrants, and other data from thousands of law enforcement agencies across the country.

The Durham County Sheriff's Office began using JusticeXchange in 2005 and saw immediate results. The success led Wake, Chatham, Orange, and Granville counties to join the pilot, totaling more than 450 criminal justice users.

Durham Police Sergeant T.J. Johnson spent four months trying to locate a suspect wanted on Federal cocaine trafficking charges. By entering one of the suspect's aliases in the JusticeXchange system, Johnson found the individual in a Wachula, Florida jail on a DWI charge.

"Federal charges were filed against the suspect and he was returned to the Middle District of North Carolina where he entered a guilty plea and is currently awaiting sentencing," said Johnson. "JusticeXchange was a major asset in apprehending this wanted fugitive."

The Greenville Police Department was looking for a felony domestic assault suspect. Officer Johny Isenberg received word the suspect was working in the Clayton or Raleigh area. A search in JusticeXchange showed he had been arrested in Clayton a year earlier and housed in Johnson County Jail. Isenberg contacted the jail and received information on the suspect's address. Within 24 hours, the individual had been arrested and jailed.

"JusticeXchange is one of the best tools I have found in a long time," said Isenberg. "Having all of that information in one place is priceless."

JusticeXchange is also used to locate missing persons, witnesses, and more.

"The ability to share multi-jurisdictional data with the ease of a few simple clicks has significantly improved our ability to monitor, locate, and apprehend offenders," said Teresa McKinney, division manager of Planning and Development for the Durham County Sheriff's Office. "During the past 10 months alone, we have seen a 56 percent increase in usage as deputies discover new ways to incorporate this technology to more efficiently meet their responsibilities."

JusticeXchange is currently being used by law enforcement agencies in Texas, New York, Florida, Washington, Kentucky, Utah, Arkansas, Indiana, South Dakota, Maryland, and Arizona. More than one million searches have been performed by JusticeXchange in the last six years, locating more than 250,000 wanted individuals.

Appriss provides innovative technology solutions that help thousands of local, state, and Federal government agencies serve and protect their citizens. Its flagship product, VINE(R), keeps crime victims informed on the custody and court status of their offender in more than 2,000 communities nationwide. Other innovative services include VINE Protective Order(R), which alerts individuals when a protective order has been served; MethCheck(R), which works with both law enforcement and pharmacies to address the illegal meth lab problem; and AlertXpress(R), a high-speed notification service for government agencies.

Source: Appriss Web site: http://www.appriss.com/

Jim Kouri, CPP is currently fifth vice-president of the National Association of Chiefs of Police and he's a staff writer for the New Media Alliance (thenma.org).  In addition, he's the new editor for the House Conservatives Fund's weblog. Kouri also serves as political advisor for Emmy and Golden Globe winning actor Michael Moriarty. 

He's former chief at a New York City housing project in Washington Heights nicknamed "Crack City" by reporters covering the drug war in the 1980s. In addition, he served as director of public safety at a New Jersey university and director of security for several major organizations.  He's also served on the National Drug Task Force and trained police and security officers throughout the country.   Kouri writes for many police and security magazines including Chief of Police, Police Times, The Narc Officer and others. He's a news writer for TheConservativeVoice.Com and PHXnews.com.  He's also a columnist for AmericanDaily.Com, MensNewsDaily.Com, MichNews.Com, and he's syndicated by AXcessNews.Com.   He's appeared as on-air commentator for over 100 TV and radio news and talk shows including Oprah, McLaughlin Report, CNN Headline News, MTV, Fox News, etc.  His book Assume The Position is available at Amazon.Com. Kouri's own website is located at http://jimkouri.us

The current economic downturn has brought significant financial stress to the auto manufacturing industry. Recent deteriorating financial, real estate, and labor markets have reduced consumer confidence and available credit, and automobile purchases have declined. While auto manufacturers broadly have experienced declining sales in 2008 as the economy has worsened, sales of the "Big 3" (General Motors, Chrysler, and Ford) have also declined relative to those of some other auto manufacturers in recent years because higher gasoline prices have particularly hurt sales of sport utility vehicles. In addition to causing potential job losses at auto manufacturers, failure of the domestic auto industry would likely adversely affect other sectors. Officials from the Big 3 have requested, and Congress is considering, immediate federal financial assistance. The following is based on the Government Accountability Office's extensive body of work on previous federal rescue efforts that dates back to the 1970s. From their previous work on federal financial assistance to large firms and municipalities, they identified three fundamental principles that can serve as a framework for considering future assistance. These principles are (1) identifying and defining the problem, (2) determining the national interests and setting clear goals and objectives that address the problem, and (3) protecting the government's interests. First, problems confronting the industry must be clearly defined -- separating out those that require an immediate response from those structural challenges that will take more time to resolve. Second, Congress should determine whether the national interest will be best served through a legislative solution, or whether market forces and established legal procedures, such as bankruptcy, should be allowed to take their course. Should Congress decide that federal financial assistance is warranted, it is important that Congress establish clear objectives and goals for this assistance. Third, given the significant financial risk the federal government may assume, the structure Congress sets up to administer any assistance should provide for appropriate mechanisms, such as concessions by all parties, controls over management, compensation for risk, and a strong independent board, to protect taxpayers from excessive or unnecessary risks. These principles could help the Congress in deciding whether to offer financial assistance to the domestic auto manufacturers. If Congress determines that a legislative solution is in the national interest, a two-pronged approach could be appropriate in these circumstances. Specifically, Congress could authorize immediate, but temporary, financial assistance to the auto manufacturing industry while concurrently establishing a board to approve, disburse, and oversee the use of these initial funds and provide any additional federal funds and continued oversight.  This board could also oversee any structural reforms of the companies. Among other responsibilities, Congress could give the board authority to establish and implement eligibility criteria for potential borrowers and to implement procedures and controls in order to protect the government's interests.